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RIIO to REV: What U.S. Power
Reform Should Learn from the
U.K.
By Heather Payne*
“The problem we’re trying to solve is that we all
know what the grid is supposed to look like. It
should be an integrated networked thing, that
has the benefits of central station generation and
transmission with the flexibility and innovation
of distributed resources. . . . It’s not a question of
the technology, it’s the fact that we have a
regulatory structure and policies that aren’t
building that system. And so it’s a system which
is capital inefficient, and it is not leading to a
system that is built around the customer.”
Richard Kauffman, New York Energy Czar1
“Today, as we seek a new paradigm which relies on renewable
resources, energy efficiency, demand response and other
advanced technologies as intrinsic parts of the electric system,
new rates and pricing structures must also be part of this
transformation.” Mina Morita, Hawaii’s PUC Chair, and
Marco Mangelsdorf, Founder, Hawaii PV Coalition2
* Assistant Director, Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation and
Resources (CLEAR) at the University of North Carolina School of Law; J.D.,
University of North Carolina School of Law; B.Ch.E., Georgia Institute of
Technology. I appreciate the useful comments provided by the participants of
the Junior Environmental Scholars Workshop at the University of
Washington School of Law. Thanks to Shannon O’Neil for outstanding
research assistance.
1. Stephen Lacey, New York's Energy Czar on the Philosophy Behind the
State's Energy Transformation, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 12, 2015),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/new-yorks-energy-czar-on-thephilosophy-behind-new-york-transformation?utm_source=SmartGrid&utm_
medium=Headline&utm_campaign=GTMDaily.
2. Mina Morita was Hawaii's House Energy Chair from 1999 to 2011 and
PUC Chair from 2011 to 2015. Marco Mangelsdorf founded the Hawaii PV
Coalition and is president of ProVision Solar. Mina Morita & Marco

31

1

32

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:1

I. Introduction
Our current electricity economy is in a state of flux, from
talk of a “death spiral” and customers abandoning the grid to
utilities working to limit renewables and impose fixed fees,
ostensibly for grid reliability and stability. Regulatory reform
to change how utilities generate power and interact with
consumers is occurring all over the country, spurred by new
economic realities, customers demanding choice, and federal
rules. U.S. regulators want a system that is reliable but
promotes competition and other consumer benefits. Many of
these have been summed up as wanting a performance-based
system rather than a capital-based system.
These conversations will continue—and, in most cases,
intensify—as states determine how they are going to address
climate change and carbon regulations such as the EPA’s Clean
Power Plan.
Absent, however, from most of these
conversations is any suggestion of lessons learned from the new
regulatory performance-based system adopted by the United
Kingdom, RIIO. RIIO, which stands for revenue = incentives +
innovation + outputs, was designed to achieve many of the
same goals as the regulatory reform currently underway in the
United States.
The lack of inclusion of RIIO in these conversations may be
partly because of the newness of RIIO, the fact that it only
applies to transmission and distribution in the U.K., or a lack
of understanding among U.S. regulators about RIIO’s
performance-based approach. However, given the similarities
in goals and desired outcomes, incorporating parts of the RIIO
framework into the regulatory discussion in the United States
could be especially helpful at this point in time.
While most, if not all, regulatory schemes are complex in
order to provide the best possible suite of incentives and to
balance competing interests, RIIO’s structure even more than
most defies easy, or quick, summarization. Unfortunately,
there is no already-existing summary of RIIO which is detailed
Mangelsdorf, It's Time to End Net Energy Metering in Hawaii, GREENTECH
MEDIA (July 6, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Its-Timeto-End-Net-Energy-Metering-in-Hawaii?utm_source=Daily&utm_medium
=Headline&utm_campaign=GTMDaily.
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enough to be useful but not so in-depth as to be boggling.
However, understanding some of the nuance is necessary to
effectively apply parts of the framework to state regulatory
reform.
Therefore, after discussing the recent history of and need
for regulatory reform in the U.K., this article will summarize
the RIIO framework and analyze the three parts best suited for
import into the regulatory frameworks of American states.
Specifically, the article will evaluate how a performance-based
framework with (1) longer rate cases, (2) proportionate
assessment, and (3) a focus on total expenditures limiting
regulatory asset value, should positively influence the U.S.
While RIIO is only used for
regulatory landscape.3
transmission and distribution in the U.K., there is a potential
for its performance-based approach to be used in generation as
well as transmission and distribution in the U.S. The article
will discuss how RIIO could be applied across regulatory
frameworks in the U.S. to vertically-integrated utilities as well
as transmission and distribution networks. As the initial
impetus for looking at RIIO was determining how it could
apply to New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”)
process, the article will conclude with a discussion of how the
parts of RIIO highlighted are likely—or not—to be
implemented as part of REV, based upon the New York Public
Staff’s Track 2 white paper.
II. U.K. Market Structure and Recent Regulatory Reform
The U.K.’s electric and gas systems underwent significant
changes, including privatization, in the 1990s.4 The end result
3. As will be discussed later, typical rate cases in the United States are
one to three years. The United Kingdom had historically used five year rate
cases, and are moving to eight year rate cases. “Proportionate treatment” is
the concept that the “degree of regulatory scrutiny” applied will change based
on various inputs.
Strategy Decision for the RIIO-ED1 Electricity
Distribution Price Control: Business Plans and Proportionate Treatment,
OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 4 (2013), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgempublications/47069/riioed1decbusinessplans.pdf. Limiting total expenditures
and regulatory asset value are also discussed in more detail later in the
paper. See infra p. 56-57.
4. Richard Pond, Liberalisation, Privatisation and Regulation in the UK
Electricity Sector, WORKING LIVES RESEARCH INST. 1, 2 (2006),
http://www.pique.at/reports/pubs/PIQUE_CountryReports_Electricity_UK_N
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was that generation is a competitive market, transmission and
distribution consist of regulated monopoly businesses, and
retail is a competitive market.5 Starting in 2008,6 the Office of
Gas and Electricity Markets (“Ofgem”) for the government of
the United Kingdom, began a review of electricity generation
and gas supply (Project Discovery) and the transmission and
distribution networks used to deliver those utilities to
consumers (RPI-X@20). Ofgem’s authority covers the entire
United Kingdom, so these analyses were done at a national
level.
A.

Project Discovery: Electricity Generation and Gas Supply

“Project Discovery,” was a “year-long study of whether the
current arrangements in [Great Britain were] adequate for
delivering secure and sustainable electricity and gas supplies
over the next 10-15 years.”7 Ofgem felt the study had to be
conducted at that time due to new carbon targets, increasing
exposure to the global natural gas market, the amount of
investment needed, and the scheduled closure of aging
generation plants.8 These are similar to what is driving
regulatory reform in the United States currently.
Project Discovery assessed the risks to generation and

ovember2006.pdf.
5. Structure of UK Electricity Industry, RWE NPOWER, http://www.rwe.
com/web/cms/en/286414/rwe-npower/about-us/our-history/structure-ofindustry/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).
6. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision,
OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 46 (2010), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgempublications/51870/decision-doc.pdf; Regulating Energy Networks For the
Future:
RPI-X@20
Principles,
Process
and
Issues,
OFGEM.GOV,
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/regulating-energynetworks-future-rpi-x20-principles-process-and-issues?docid=76&refer
=Networks/rpix20/ConsultDocs (last visited Oct 1, 2015).
7. Project Discovery: Options for Delivering Secure and Sustainable
Energy Supplies, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 1 (2010), https://www.of
gem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/40354/projectdiscoveryfebcondocfinal.pdf.
8. Action Needed So Energy Supplies Remain Secure: Ofgem’s Project
Discovery Findings, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 1 (2010),
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/76124/discoveryfs.pdf;
Ofgem
Pushes on with Scrutiny of Security in GB Energy Supply, OFFICE OF GAS &
ELEC. MKTS. 1, 1 (2009), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/40362/
discovery-status-report.pdf.
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supply using four scenarios,9 and in all growth and
environmental commitment scenarios, the findings from the
study were stark: “unprecedented” levels of investment were
going to be necessary against a backdrop of increased risk and
uncertainty; the lack of investment in low-carbon technologies
would likely lead to greater costs to decrease carbon intensity
in the future; spot market prices were not high enough to
incent additional peaking capacity to be brought online;
interdependence with other markets might undermine supply;
and higher cost could affect consumer demand, which in turn
could impact the competitiveness of business and industry.10
To address these challenges, Ofgem developed five
potential policy responses.11 These policy responses included
(1) implementing targeted reforms, (2) enhanced obligations,
(3) enhanced obligations plus renewables tenders, (4) capacity
tenders, and (5) a central energy buyer. However, each had
drawbacks. 12
9. The scenarios were: high growth/strong environmental commitment;
low
growth/strong
environmental
commitment;
high
growth/low
environmental commitment; and low growth/low environmental commitment.
Ofgem Publishes a Comprehensive Review of Britain’s Energy Supplies,
OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 2 (2009), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgempublications/76390/ofgem-discovery-pr8-2.pdf.
10. Project Discovery: Options for Delivering Secure and Sustainable
Energy Supplies, supra note 7, at 1-2.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Targeted reforms would reduce carbon price uncertainty, improve
price signals, and improve the ability for demand-side responses. While
Ofgem believed targeted reforms would increase incentives while retaining
the benefits of a competitive market, there was concern that these might be
insufficient to address the need for increased investment to secure supply.
Especially with increased exposure to the worldwide natural gas market and
recent political instabilities in gas-producing regions, the possibility of
insufficient supply could negate the benefits of a competitive market. An
enhanced obligations policy—where there would be legal repercussions for
companies who did not procure sufficient supply—would require suppliers to
address the possibility of those threats. However, this would require market
participants to be responsible for supply security, which might be impacted
by events beyond their control (like Russia cutting off supply to Europe),
leading to a risk that this policy alone would also be insufficient to address
the need for increased investment.
The enhanced obligations plus
renewables tender policy had a similar benefit of requiring market
participants to be responsible for supply, but added that industry was also
responsible for ensuring that renewables targets were met more efficiently by
offering a guaranteed return. This increased certainty would be more likely
to ensure that renewable targets would be met, but still had the risk of not
addressing all investment challenges or ensuring that longer-term climate

5
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After extensive public comment on the various proposed
policy solutions, Ofgem determined that “significant action will
be called for to deliver both security of supply and
environmental objectives at affordable prices longer term[.]”13
The most pressing issues with the current wholesale market
included the strength of imbalance price signals,14 enabling
distributed generation, interactions with other markets,
available transmission, incentives for the incumbent system
operator, and the need for other market reforms.15 While not
as quickly implemented as those dealing with transmission and
distribution, a review of electricity balancing arrangements
was completed in May 2014,16 and a capacity market has been
implemented, with rules going into effect in March 2015.17
Reforms to address the other issues raised are under
discussion. None, however, is significant to regulatory reforms
occurring in the United States.

B.

RPI-X@20:

Electricity

and

Gas

Transmission

and

goals would be met. On the other hand, capacity tenders would be sufficient
at accelerating investment, as the tender would include all forms of
generation, gas storage, and other infrastructure projects. However, this
opened the customers to the highest amount of risk, as they would be
responsible for “any poor decisions surrounding the type and scale of capacity
required.” The last option, considered the most “radical,” was to establish a
central energy buyer, responsible for coordinating all future investment,
similar to the situation when the utilities were nationalized. While this
policy would provide the greatest certainty, legal challenges were likely based
on European Union law, customers were still at risk, and there was a fear
that innovation would be stifled. Action Needed so Energy Supplies Remain
Secure: Ofgem’s Project Discovery Findings, supra note 8, at 3.
13. Project Discovery: Options for Delivering Secure and Sustainable
Energy Supplies, supra note 7, at 1.
14. Price signals for short-term imbalances on the grid can allow quicker
and cheaper balancing; however, if the price signal is not strong enough, then
the imbalance will not be rectified at the lowest cost. Project Discovery:
Options for Delivering Secure and Sustainable Energy Supplies, supra note 7,
at 19.
15. Id. at 19-21.
16. Electricity Balancing Significant Code Review, OFGEM.GOV,
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-market/market-efficiencyreview-and-reform/electricity-balancing-significant-code-review (last visited
Oct. 1, 2015).
17. Capacity Market (CM) Rules, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk
/electricity/wholesale-market/market-efficiency-review-and-reform/electricitymarket-reform/capacity-market-cm-rules (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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Distribution
While the review of the wholesale electricity generation
and gas supply market was ongoing, a similar review was
taking place for the electricity and gas transmission and
distribution network framework.
Since privatization, the
transmission and distribution networks had been regulated
under a revenue control (what Ofgem termed “RPI-X”)
framework.18 Similar to the challenges determined by Project
Discovery for generation and supply, the main issues identified
in the current RPI-X scheme were customer engagement,
value, and the ability of the current network framework to
adequately incorporate sustainable generation, low carbon
sources, and social targets.19
Ofgem’s proposed solution recommended a new regulatory
framework based on twelve components.20 After extensive
consultation and numerous comments, Ofgem adopted a new
framework in October, 2010.21 This framework was termed the
“RIIO model – Revenue set to deliver strong Incentives,
Innovation and Outputs.”22 Ofgem adopted RIIO as the “new
way to regulate energy networks.”23 While retaining some of
the motivations behind and the structures of the regulatory
regime set up during this initial privatization and
liberalization of the energy sector, RIIO adjusts the focus of the
18. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future: RPI-X@20 Principles,
Process and Issues, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 17-20 (2009),
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2009/02/principlesprocesses-and-issues-con-doc_final---270209.pdf.
19. Id.
20. These components included maintaining the current industry
structure including ex-ante control but requiring more consumer
engagement, longer price controls (rate cases), and the option of third parties
to play a greater role in delivery. Additionally, rate cases would be outputsled with greater incentives. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future: RPIX@20 Recommendations, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. (2010),
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/51901/rpixrecommendations.pdf [hereinafter Regulating Energy Networks for the
Future].
21. Background — RPI-X@20 Review, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.
gov.uk/network-regulation-riio-model/background-rpi-x20-review (last visited
Oct. 1, 2015).
22. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 3.
23. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision,
supra note 6.
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regulatory framework for the electricity and gas transmission
and distribution systems, 24 provides for competition,
encourages innovation, and modifies the utility regulatory
scheme in significant ways.25 A number of these could be
beneficial if applied in the United States.
III. RIIO
Ofgem set a number of lofty goals for RIIO to accomplish. 26
However, it all boils down to delivering green energy to
customers cheaply.27 Additionally, Ofgem wanted the new
framework to be “more transparent, more accountable, more
Ofgem importantly
accessible and more proportionate.”28
recognized that the “nature, scale and location of demand” for

24. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC.
MKTS. 1, 1 (2010), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/51871/riioha
ndbook.pdf.
In the U.K., these companies are referred to as electricity transmission
owners, gas transmission owners, electricity distribution network operators,
and gas distribution networks. Generation (supply) and the retail markets
are regulated separately. Id. at 2.
25. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 61-65.
26. The stated goal of energy network regulation is generally to
“encourage energy network companies to: play a full role in the delivery of a
sustainable energy sector [and] deliver long-term value for money network
services for existing and future consumers.” RIIO: A New Way to Regulate
Energy Networks: Final Decision, supra note 6, at 8. Sustainability includes
a low carbon footprint and other environmental objectives, secure supplies of
energy, and meeting the needs of vulnerable customers. See Handbook for
Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 2.
27. Customer engagement is a central consideration of RIIO, but that is
outside the scope of this paper. In the RIIO framework, the definition of a
customer is more encompassing than what utilities typically regard as
customers. The definition includes “generators, shippers, interconnectors,
independent network operators (IDNOs and IGTs), suppliers and energy
service companies (ESCos)” as well as traditional business and home
consumers. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 3.
Because of the extensive focus on customers, there are significantly more
engagement requirements, with the goal of demonstrating the impact of
engagement throughout the regulatory process and evaluate whether and
how the engagement was successful. Ofgem set the expectation that network
companies proactively engage with customers. Id. at 13-15. If network
companies consistently do not engage customers, Ofgem may place a license
requirement that they demonstrate “thorough and ongoing engagement” and
take enforcement action if the requirement isn’t met. Id. at 16 tbl.1.
28. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 3.
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services are expected to change in the future.29 That is also
true in the United States. RIIO anticipates dealing with these
changes through a detailed price control review process which
sets outputs and other measures for a longer period of time.
A. Longer Rate Cases, Fewer Regulatory Reviews
The RIIO framework is meant to fundamentally change
the relationship between the regulator and the regulated
companies. It does this by changing what is measured and how
long it is measured for. Traditionally, regulation was focused
on inputs.30 By focusing on outputs rather than inputs, the
framework is designed to be more effective, leading to the
ability for regulatory reviews to be less frequent.31 Also, as in
the U.S., most network companies in the U.K. are focused on
meeting challenges with additional infrastructure.
This
infrastructure is then capitalized and added into the rate base.
However, this is not always the best option for customers or the
cheapest in the long term. This additional certainty would
consequently drive innovation and investment.
A price control is similar to a rate case in the United
States. The default price control in RIIO—how long the
parameters set during the price control review will be in
place—is eight years,32 rather than the shorter time frame of
five years now utilized.33 Even with prices set for longer
periods, incentives are in place to allow for higher returns for
innovative companies exceeding output goals. As an incentive
for companies to do well, those companies not meeting output
requirements would see lower returns and more regulatory
scrutiny.34

29. Id. at 10.
30. The State of New York Department of Public Service Staff provided a
good overview of cost-of-service ratemaking and concerns with it. SEE STAFF
WHITE PAPER ON RATEMAKING AND UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS, N.Y. STATE
DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. No. 14-M-0101, at 16-21 (2015) .
31. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 3.
32. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 27.
33. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 31.
34. The lower returns would be achieved through cost-sharing
mechanisms and asymmetrical incentives. Id. at 3.
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B. Price Control Review Process
The process that Ofgem uses to implement RIIO is
important because it demonstrates both how the performancebased outputs are determined and is also where Ofgem uses
proportionate assessment. Both of these should be used in
regulatory frameworks in the United States.
Ofgem has defined the detailed process to determine the
rates that network companies can charge the public for their
services. The amount charged correlates to the amount of
revenue they can expect to generate. The price control review
process is designed to take approximately 21-30 months to
complete and is comprised of four stages. The main actions
taken at each stage are summarized in the following table.
Stage
1

2

3
4

Main Actions
Ofgem: (1) defines outputs for the price control period;
(2) determines methodologies for proportionate
assessment and fast-tracking; and (3) codifies #1 and
#2 in a consultation document.
Network companies develop and submit business
plans.
Ofgem reviews and determines level of
proportionate assessment and decides on fasttracking (yes or no). If yes, license conditions set and
company moves to Stage 4.
Network companies revise business plan based on
Ofgem assessment in Stage 2.
License conditions set; price control review complete.

First, the Ofgem price control review team will determine
outputs and the price control methodology. At the end of Stage
1, a consultation document will define the timetable for the
price control review, outline key issues, establish outputs to be
delivered during the next period, including the desired level of
performance for those outputs, and other parameters.35 This
35. The other parameters include efficiency and output incentives,
inflation indexation, business plan requirements, the range of the estimated
cost of capital, the length of control, and the use of uncertainty mechanisms.
Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 9.
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document becomes an input for the network companies as they
develop their business plans, which are submitted in Stage 2.
Perhaps of most interest for the network companies, the
document also lists the criteria which will determine the level
of
regulatory
scrutiny
(proportionate
assessment).36
Proportionate assessment—how strictly a company’s plan will
be scrutinized and how quickly Ofgem will make a decision on
the price control review—is based on “(a) the quality of the
business plan submitted and (b) the network company’s
performance in delivering outputs and value for money in
previous periods.”37 Proportional assessment is designed to
incent companies to deliver primary outputs well and submit
good business plans. By doing so, they will be required to
spend less time in a regulatory process, enabling more time to
be spent on the business.38
The consultation document also details how the fast-track
determination will be made.39 Fast tracking is Ofgem’s way of
rewarding businesses with justified plans by accepting the plan
with minimal review at Stage 2, essentially bypassing Stage 3
and most of Stage 4.
In Stage 2, network companies develop and submit their
business plans. A network company is to determine “what it
intends to deliver for consumers of network services over time
and what revenue it needs to earn from existing and future
customers to ensure delivery is financed[,]” with the company
being responsible for justifying all expenditures.40 Business
plans must also “include reference to . . . the cost of capital they
would require to ensure that the package was financeable.”41
Also, to address the potential for network companies to
gravitate toward infrastructure solutions, Ofgem will assess
the extent to which a wide range of alternative, noninfrastructure solutions have been proposed in the business
plans.42
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
options

Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 49.
This includes a wide range of options for reliability. The range of
Ofgem mentions includes things such as pricing methodology and
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Ofgem reviews the plans and then determines which
companies will receive less regulatory scrutiny (proportionate
assessment and fast tracking).43 Well-justified business plans44
will likely have a final proposal come out of the price control
review process closer to what the company requested. On the
other hand, those plans presented to Ofgem with less detail
will likely be more heavily scrutinized and more likely to have
other evidence applied to the plan.45 The assessment tools used
by Ofgem to review business plans will also vary according to
the level of regulatory scrutiny.46
If a company is chosen for fast track at this point, all
elements of a price control settlement will be drafted at this
stage, including license changes. The fast-tracked companies
then move directly to Stage 4.47 A company which is not fast
tracked moves to Stage 3.48 In Stage 3, companies submit
revised business plans, addressing comments and concerns
made by Ofgem during Stage 2. Ofgem will develop a proposal,
including license modifications, in Stage 4.49 This will be
accomplished by Ofgem taking the business plans and other
data provided by the network companies and applying the
methodology published previously, using proportionate
assessment. After the proposal is submitted, the network
companies must decide whether to agree to the proposed price
access rule changes. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final
Decision, supra note 6, at 13; see Open Letter from Stephen Smith, Managing
Dir., Networks, to Suppliers, generators, customers and other interested
parties (Aug. 4, 2009) (https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/44218/
impact-cdcm-and-dp5-distribution-charges-1-april-2010-customer-letter.pdf).
43. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 10,
58.
44. Ofgem considers a “well-justified” business plan to demonstrate a
focus on primary output delivery; consideration of secondary deliverables; a
clear and well-evidenced case; an open minded consideration of available
options; a link between costs and primary outputs; a consideration of the
longer term; value for money; effective engagement with a range of
stakeholders; and consideration of working with others. Id. at 48-49.
45. Other evidence could include benchmarking, information in other
company’s business plans, and historical performance. Id. at 55-56.
46. These tools range from an “examination and reassessment of
particular project plans” at the light end to “option to require companies to
undertake further market testing” at the highest level of regulatory scrutiny.
Id. at 63 fig. 21.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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control package or seek judicial review.50 If agreed to, the
proposal is final unless challenged by a third party.51
C. Base Revenue, Incentives, Innovation and Outputs
Network companies, naturally, are interested in what
Ofgem will let them charge customers. At a high level, prices
are set by Ofgem defining the outputs expected, and network
companies creating and justifying plans to deliver these
outputs, including revenue levels necessary to deliver
efficiently.52 To put it more granularly, to determine what
revenue network companies can expect (and will be allowed)
during the price control period, three things are added
together: (1) a baseline revenue allowance53 (expected efficient
expenditure, asset value, capitalization, and weighted average
cost of capital, among other things); (2) an amount based on
rules to adjust revenues in light of a company’s performance,
comprised
of
upfront
efficiency
incentives
and
rewards/penalties for delivery of outputs (the incentives and
outputs piece or RIIO); and (3) an amount based on rules to
adjust revenues for other factors, comprised of indexation and
other uncertainty mechanisms.54 These, plus innovation, are
explored in more detail.
1. Base Revenue
Unlike the traditional cost of service regulatory approach
employed in the United States,55 RIIO is a performance-based
50. Id. at 11. If they do not agree to the final control package, the case is
referred to review by the Competition Commission. The Competition
Commission is independent and functions similarly to judicial review in the
United States. Id. at 20.
51. There are only two grounds on which a modification request may be
made: that the final proposal 1) operates against the public interest; or 2)
may be expected to operate against the public interest. However, third
parties wanting to challenge any final proposal and settlement must also
demonstrate that they have been effectively engaged throughout the price
control review process. Id. at 21.
52. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 17.
53. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 56.
54. Id. at 29.
55. JONATHON A. LESSER & LEONARDO R. GIACCHINO, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ENERGY REGULATION 67 (2007).
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regulatory scheme with a regulated revenue allowance.
Ofgem’s base revenue calculation starts with an “assessment of
expected efficient costs required, during the eight-year control
period, to deliver the primary outputs over time and to deliver
long-term value for money. The assessment of expected
efficient costs . . . will be largely based on [Ofgem’s] assessment
of the company’s business plan.”56
Allowances for taxation, capitalization and depreciation
will then be added to that expected efficient assessment. Like
most utility regulatory regimes,57 Ofgem’s assessment will
incorporate a rate of return on asset value (“RAV”).58 The
purpose of the allowed RAV is twofold: 1) to compensate
investors; and 2) to provide value which facilitates investment
in new infrastructure.59 However, when assets are added to a
utility’s asset base, consumers pay RAV on them for the entire
life of the asset—much longer than one rate control period.
Therefore, to ensure network companies are not growing the
asset base to increase revenues, RIIO focuses on total cost.
The focus on “totex”60—total costs of delivery—rather than
the specific cost categories of operational expenses (“opex”) and
capital expenses (“capex”)61 will theoretically drive efficiency,
with money being spent where it will most help deliver
outputs. Even with this overall measure being used and with
well-justified business plans, however, Ofgem recognized the
potential for delivery companies to inflate expenditures.62 To
56. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 56.
57. LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 55, at 44-45.
58. Ofgem has committed to using “a real, weighted average cost of
capital” (“WACC”) to set the rate of return allowed, with the cost of debt
assumed in WACC based on a long-term trailing average, updated annually.
Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 105, 108-09. A
capital asset pricing model will be used to determine the cost of equity fed
into the WACC. Id.
59. Id. at 108.
60. RIIO defines totex “the companies’ controllable costs which exclude
business rates, license fees, pension’s contributions and shrinkage.” RIIOGD1 Annual Report 2013-14, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 41 n.24 (2015),
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2015/03/riiogd1_annual_report_2013-14-final.pdf.
61. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 64.
Additionally, Ofgem plans to benchmark firms “based on the total costs of
delivering the baseline performance level for primary outputs” during the
business plan review. Id. at 61.
62. Unfortunately, Ofgem did not come up with a completely suitable
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partially address this issue, Ofgem will set a fixed percentage
of total expenditure that can be capitalized during the price
control period.63 This will limit the amount that a company can
add to its RAV. This should also incent more efficient
deployment of capital, as network companies should spend
capital on initiatives that are most aligned to delivering the
performance-driven outputs. If network companies need to
overspend capital to achieve an output, that capital essentially
becomes the equivalent of opex (and does not get added into the
asset base).
“The fundamental economic goal of regulation is
straightforward: to mimic a competitive market outcome, even
when the underlying market is not competitive.”64 Ofgem hopes
setting the totex expected efficient expenditure allowance,
limiting the amount of totex that can be capitalized and,
therefore, limiting the increase in asset base, will achieve that
goal.
2. Incentives
The incentives as part of the RIIO framework are designed
to focus on output delivery performance, using “uncertainty
mechanisms” where these add value for the customer, and
“symmetric upfront efficiency incentive rate for all costs.”65
The incentive portion is similar to cost sharing – if a network
company found a way to deliver outputs at a lower cost, then it
would earn higher profits but part of that benefit would be
shared with consumers. Likewise, if costs increased above
what was expected, consumers would pay only a portion of
those charges, and profits would decrease by the rest.66
Specific incentives for delivery are set during the price control
review process.67
countermeasure. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20,
at 38.
63. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 109.
64. LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 55, at 17.
65. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision,
supra note 6, at 3.
66. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 41.
67. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 74.
Financial incentives will be used by Ofgem to incent delivery of outputs when
“there is clarity on the primary outputs to be delivered; there is confidence in
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In addition to financial incentives, Ofgem will set a “fixed
and symmetric efficiency incentive rate” during each price
control review.68 This is essentially designed as a risk-sharing
mechanism, with the efficiency incentive rate as the “sharing
factor.”69 The same rate applies to operating and capital
expenditures. Therefore, utilities are not being rewarded just
for spending more capital.70
Due to the long time frame and the fact that many of the
inputs are based on assumptions, there will always be some
uncertainty, both in revenue and primary output projections.71
In addition to the efficiency incentive rate, Ofgem envisions
three types of uncertainty mechanisms which allow revenue to
change during the price control period, including some which
will adjust automatically.72 Prices will be indexed to the retail
the data used to measure performance; [Ofgem] consider[s] delivery of the
primary output to be important; and there are not already incentives in place
on the network company though other schemes or obligations.” Id. at 76.
What level of incentive – and, therefore, how strong of a market signal the
incentive would send – will also depend on confidence in the accuracy and
reliability of data. Incentives are not uniform, but can vary by company. Id.
at 78. Non-financial (reputational) incentives may be used when financial
incentives are inappropriate for a particular output. Id. at 79.
68. This efficiency incentive rate is “a commitment to the way that the
revenue that the company is allowed to collect adjusts upwards or
downwards in light of what it actually spends during the price control
period.” Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 83-84.
“If the efficiency incentive rate is set at 40 per cent, the company’s investors
will earn £40 profit (before tax) for each £100 that the company saves during
the price control period and bear £40 of each additional £100 the company
spends. The remainder will be passed on to consumers through lower or
higher network charges.” Id.
69. Id. at 84.
70. The lower boundary of the rate is set by Ofgem at a level where it
feels companies will have sufficient disincentive to overspend unnecessarily
to increase the company’s regulatory asset value. Id. Adjustments based on
the efficiency incentive rate will be made annually, but on a time lag to allow
for audited data to be used. The company may then charge customers based
on the adjustments. Id. at 87.
71. Id. at 89.
72. The three types of uncertainty mechanisms are: 1) uncertainty
mechanisms fully-calibrated at the price control review (e.g., indexation,
volume drivers, revenue triggers, and use it or lose it mechanisms) where no
review is conducted and revenue adjustments occur automatically; 2)
forward-looking revenue adjustment determined by Ofgem during the price
control (e.g., revenue adjustment based on updated cost assessment if a
trigger event occurs); and 3) revenue allowance determined after company
incurs relevant expenditure (e.g., pass-through items, logging-up of actual
expenditures subject to ex post efficiency review, and backward-looking
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price index, so prices will rise regularly during the price control
period,73 and expenditures during the price control period will
continue to be adjusted for inflation as they have been in the
past.74 Aside from that automatic adjustment, an uncertainty
mechanism will only be included if doing so provides value for
consumers; no uncertainty mechanism will be included without
a clear rationale.75Uncertainty mechanisms would also ideally
“shield a network company entirely from the effects of rising
and falling volume.”76
Under RIIO, unlike the current state of affairs, third
parties could be given control of large delivery projects,
assuming these can be separated from the legacy company and
where this would drive innovation and value.77 Interestingly,
one of the potential issues this could create is uncertainty
around legacy network company revenues.78
Comments
received while RIIO was being developed indicated that the
incumbent network companies “expressed concerns” about this
potential.79 Essentially a disincentive, this proposal was
primarily designed as a threat to ensure the companies with
present licenses behave appropriately.80
3. Innovation
Innovation is to be encouraged through incentives
controlling price, the potential to give responsibility for
revenue adjustment based on benchmarking analysis of outturn costs), with
revenue adjusted after the magnitude of the expenditure is known. Id. at 9092. “Outturn” is defined by the Financial Times as “the actual amounts,
results etc. at the end of a period of activity, rather than those that were
expected or calculated earlier.” Definition of Outturn, FIN. TIMES LEXICON,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=outturn (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).
73. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 28.
74. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 100.
This is currently the retail prices index, and will continue to be the RPI.
While some suggested a move to the consumer price index, Ofgem considered
that unrealistic given that “corporate and government index-linked bonds
continue to use RPI as the relevant index.” Id.
75. Id. at 95-96.
76. Id. at 100.
77. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 34.
78. Id. at 38.
79. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision,
supra note 6, at 34.
80. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 40.
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delivery to third parties, providing stimulus funds, and
creating “prizes” for innovation in specific areas.81 Also in
terms of innovation, the goal is to encourage both technological
and commercial innovation. While some innovation may be
accomplished through the price control process or the
involvement of third parties, innovations with a less clear path
to commercialization may need additional funding.82
Therefore, RIIO also includes an innovation stimulus, which is
open to both network companies and non-network parties.83
Non-network companies will be able to suggest and be awarded
funding, and the expectation is that network companies will
open their networks for testing and trials of new technologies.84
4. Outputs
In the RIIO framework, outputs are set out in the utilities’
operating license, so consumers know what they are paying for.
Outputs are designed to be “a comprehensive reflection of the
outcomes that matter to the users of the network, as well as
being material, controllable, measurable, comparable,
applicable and legally compliant.”85 In determining which
outputs will be measured, Ofgem established six categories:
customer satisfaction, reliability and availability, safe network
services, connection terms, environmental impact, and social
obligations.86 For each primary output (and any secondary
deliverables), Ofgem will determine the base level that
81. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision,
supra note 6, at 3.
82. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 51-52.
83. However, non-network parties would need to have a license to
participate in the program. Id. at 125-26. The stimulus innovation package
“will provide partial funding for innovation projects that relate to the
provision of network services and have as their intent delivery of a
sustainable energy sector." Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model,
supra note 24, at 128. Any stage of innovation is eligible for funding, from
basic research and development to pilot projects, with projects chosen
through a competitive grant process. Id. at 123. See generally Network
Innovation, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/distributionnetworks/network-innovation (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
84. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 12728.
85. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision,
supra note 6, at 22.
86. Id. at 21.
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companies are expected to meet during each price control.87
For customer satisfaction, reliability and availability, and
conditions for connection, the primary outputs should
demonstrate delivered service level and “relate to the service
For environmental
for consumers and network users.”88
impact, the primary outputs should demonstrate the impact on
environmental targets. For social obligations and safety, the
primary outputs should show compliance with legislation.89
Performance levels for primary outputs can be expressed either
as a percent change or an absolute number.90 These outputs
are then inserted into the company’s license as a condition.91
How companies are doing in relation to these metrics are
published annually, primarily to incent consistent action on the
basis of reputation and the possibility of it becoming
tarnished.92
Additionally, a balanced scorecard with all
outputs will be developed for each network sector, enabling
comparison between companies.93
These outputs and
deliverables will remain in place for the entire eight-year
period, and potentially much longer.94 What these primary
outputs and secondary deliverables 95 are, will directly impact
the price allowed to be charged during the price control review
87. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 24.
88. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 34.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 46.
91. Id. at 81.
92. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 40.
93. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 80.
94. Id. at 32.
95. Secondary deliverables are envisioned to manage network risk,
provide the means for delivering primary outputs in the future, and allow for
technical and commercial innovation projects. Therefore, one of the main
purposes of secondary deliverables are to give network companies the ability
to invest more during this price control period than what is necessary for
simply meeting primary outputs. As such, they are likely to be intermediate
outputs, as there must be some measure to hold network companies
accountable. To aid in accountability, secondary deliverables should focus on
what the “means to the end” is, rather than pertain to a specific method of
delivering that end. However, this additional investment will only be allowed
to occur where the business plan shows benefit over the long term during
future price control periods. Including secondary deliverables is not a
foregone conclusion; they will only be included when there is a clear and
credible case for including one due to the added administrative burden. And
whatever secondary deliverables are agreed upon, network companies are
still required to meet all primary outputs. Id. at 39-40, 43-45.
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period, as these are what the network companies’ business
plans must be designed to deliver.96
The specific outputs—and how companies are meeting
them—also provide an opportunity for customer engagement.
Knowing these outputs in advance also ensures that there are
incentives for companies to deliver.97
D. Mid-period reviews / potential for change
Ofgem also expects RIIO to adapt; following price control
reviews, summary documents will be published which will
include lessons learned.98 Standardized data collection will
continue and will aid in benchmarking.99 Additionally, RIIO is
designed with one mid-period review to occur during the fourth
year of the price control period and to take effect at the
beginning of the fifth. A mid-term review, while standard, is
very limited in scope and would “only result in changes to
revenue where requirements on the network companies change
significantly.”100
Changes made during the mid-period review will heavily
depend on whether primary outputs need to change.101 If they
do, Ofgem acknowledges that revenues may also need to be
adjusted, but “[a]ny changes to allowed revenues will focus on
the incremental impact on expenditure requirements from the
specific change to outputs, without re-opening the whole price
control.”102 Items outside that limited scope will be managed in
96. Id. at 32.
97. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision,
supra note 6, at 3.
98. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 12.
99. Id.
100. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 32.
The scope of the mid-period review will clearly be defined in the price control
review process and set out in the license conditions, but would not include a
review of past expenditures, financial assumptions, or incentive
arrangements. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24,
at 28. Incentive mechanisms, rate of return, or other parameters would not
change unless forced to do so by output changes. RIIO: A New Way to
Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, supra note 6, at 27.
101. The limited scope is necessary to ensure that the incentive signals
function appropriately. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra
note 24, at 93.
102. Id.
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other ways, including incentives.
E. Implementation
Importantly, Ofgem concluded that RIIO could be
effectively implemented “under the existing industry
structure,”103 and was first used to set prices for
transmission104 and gas distribution105 in 2013 and electricity
distribution in 2015.106
For the gas distribution network price control, which sets
the revenues gas distribution network (“GDN”) companies can
recover and the outputs they will deliver between April 1, 2013,
and March 31, 2021, no network company was fast-tracked,
although Ofgem did note that the business plans were
generally of higher quality than they had received in the
past.107 Ofgem clearly identified expected outputs:
[W]e expect GDNs to reduce the safety risk by
40-60 per cent during RIIO-GD1. We also expect
GDNs to reduce gas transport losses, which
comprise 95 per cent of GDNs’ carbon footprint,
by 15 to 20 per cent by the end of the period. . . .
[W]e will require GDNs for the first time to
deliver an improvement in the public awareness
of the risks of carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning, a
key gas safety issue. We will publish an
assessment of GDNs’ comparative performance.
We will also require GDNs to connect around
80,000 fuel poor customers to the gas network
over the price control period.
We

will

require

the

GDNs

to

deliver

103. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 13.
104. RIIO-T1 Price Control, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/
network-regulation-riio-model/riio-t1-price-control (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
105. Id.
106. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision,
supra note 6, at 4; RIIO-T1 Price Control, supra note 104.
107. RIIO-GD1: Final Proposals-Overview, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS.
1, 7-8 (2012), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/48154/1riiogd1f
poverviewdec12.pdf.
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improvements in customer services. We have set
out a financial incentive mechanism to reward
(or penalise) their performance. Overall, GDNs
will need to improve customer satisfaction from
current levels to the upper quartile GDN
performance to avoid a penalty and earn a
reward. We are also confirming standards for
connecting new customers to their network, as
well as our intention to develop voluntary
standards for biomethane connections.
Finally, our reliability output measures will
require GDNs to maintain the integrity of
network assets, as well as meet the current
network capacity and security of supply
standards.108
Ofgem’s goal is to maintain the efficiency incentive rate was
around 50% for all sectors.109 At 50%, any cost overruns would
be split between customers and investors evenly. The same
would be true for any cost savings. For this gas price control
period, while it varies by company, the range is 62-64%.110 On
the innovation side, Ofgem requested network companies
submit innovation strategies, which could be funded with
between 0.5% and 1% of overall revenue. At final settlement,
the Network Innovation Allowances ranged from 0.5% for those
plans Ofgem felt performed poorly against their assessment
criteria to 0.7% for those strategies that were better justified.111
In terms of uncertainty mechanisms, in addition to the
automatic annual indexation change,112 Ofgem is allowing
revenue discussions to be reopened for smart metering cost
recovery.113
108. Id. at 4-5; See generally RIIO-GDI: Final Proposals - Supporting
Document - Outputs, incentives and innovation, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS.
(2012), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/48155/2riiogd1fpout
putsincentivesdec12.pdf.
109. RIIO-GD1: Final Proposals-Overview, supra note 107, at 11.
110. Id. at 29.
111. Id. at 21-22.
112. Id. at 33.
113. Id. at 31. Ofgem will also allow GDNs to request reopening if
“uncertain costs” climb to a pre-set cumulative cap. Id. at 32.
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On the financial side, the weighted actual cost of capital
was set at 4.2%. Ofgem re-committed that well-performing
network companies “can earn post-tax real double-digit returns
on (notional) equity, and GDNs who perform poorly would be
exposed to returns at or below the cost of debt.”114
The first annual summary report detailing outcomes under
the gas distribution price control was issued by Ofgem in
March, 2015.115 Ofgem noted that “[t]here are a few specific
outputs within the safety and reliability output commitments
that need attention because the required level in the first year
hasn’t been met or is forecast to fall short over the RIIO-GD1
period.”116 For safety, the output not being met is repair risk;
for reliability, the issues relate to supply interruptions.117 One
GDN is not meeting customer survey targets for connection and
planned interruption surveys and was penalized using the
incentive mechanism.118 All other primary outputs are being
met.119
Forecasting performance over the entire eight-year price
control period, GDNs expect their actual costs will be 11%
below the allowance set by Ofgem, with investors reaping 64%
of those savings and customers 36% through the ratios set in
the efficiency incentive.120 Returns on regulated equity are
expected to be between 8.9% and 11.8% over the period,
assuming all GDNs deliver outputs at the required level for the
entire period.121 No claims under uncertainty mechanisms
were made during the first year.122 Overall, Ofgem expects the
gas distribution component of an average annual consumer’s
bill will decrease by almost £1 per year over the eight year
price control period.123
As it may be the one most applicable to the regulatory
changes occurring in the United States, looking at the

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 38.
RIIO-GD1 Annual Report 2013-14, supra note 60 at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6, 28.
Id. at 16-38.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 7.
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electricity distribution price control could be most instructive.
One electricity distribution network company, Western Power
Distribution, was fast-tracked, and had its license conditions
issued in May, 2014. The remaining network companies
received their license conditions implementing Ofgem’s final
determinations in February 2015.124 Unfortunately, as this is
the last group of network companies to implement RIIO, no
data are yet available.125
IV. How RIIO Should Inform the U.S.
The U.K. and many systems in the U.S. have the same
goals, and the same challenges. Goals include delivering a low
carbon economy, with smarter networks, customer choice, at a
lower cost to the consumer.
Shared challenges are the
increased use of distributed generation, extending high voltage
transmission lines to move energy from utility-scale renewable
generation to load centers, and an increase in intermittent
generation.126 All of these suggest a move toward performancebased regulation.
A. Regulatory Frameworks in the United States
In order to analyze if RIIO could be applicable in the
United States, it is useful to look at the regulatory frameworks
employed by various states. At a high level, most regulatory
frameworks fall into one of two categories: vertically integrated
or deregulated.
In a fully regulated/vertically integrated utility model, the
utility is responsible for generation, transmission and
distribution, and the retail functions for consumers within a
specific service territory. The utility often owns many of the
generation assets and the transmission and distribution lines.
There is no choice for the retail consumer. North Carolina,
124. RIIO-ED1 Price Control, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/net
work-regulation-riio-model/riio-ed1-price-control (last visited Oct. 1 2015).
125. Network Performance Under RIIO, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.
gov.uk//network-regulation-riio-model/network-performance-under-riio (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015). Ofgem expects to publish performance information and
data after the first year of operation of the price control. Id.
126. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 51.
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South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Colorado are
examples of where utilities are still vertically integrated.
In a deregulated market, a grid operator manages the
wholesale market for generation. A regulated utility handles
the transmission and distribution. Customers can choose their
supplier, who purchases generation on the wholesale market
and then sells it to those consumers with whom that supplier
has a contract. This enables consumers, if they choose, to
specialize their utility offering. For example, customers can
determine what mix of generation assets they want producing
their energy, such as 100% solar or 100% renewables.
Consumers can also opt for suppliers which offer cheaper rates
at night and on the weekends or other time-of-use options.
New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Texas are all
deregulated markets.
B. Applying RIIO
Parts of RIIO should be applied to both frameworks. While
RIIO only applies to transmission and distribution in the U.K.,
there is no reason why RIIO’s solutions should not apply to
generation as well as transmission and distribution in the U.S
since both face similar issues.Specifically, the adoption of
longer rate cases, proportionate assessment, and a focus on
total expenditures limiting regulatory asset value should be
applied in each model.
Under RIIO, rate cases are set for eight years, rather than
the one to three years common in the United States
currently.127 However, just because a long rate-case period
occurs, that does not mean utilities can simply continue to
operate without risk of regulatory action for that period of
time. All have performance targets, and those targets can
come with automatic penalties for failure to meet them.
127. New York’s REV process is looking at length of rate cases, and
California is actively exploring rate reform, including duration, but it doesn’t
appear either is looking at a period as long as eight years. California’s
current timing is for a generate rate case to occur every three years. Jeff St.
John, Inside SoCal Edison's Plan to Open Its Grid to Distributed Energy,
GREENTECH MEDIA (July 1, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles
/read/inside-socal-edisons-plan-to-open-its-grid-to-distributed-energy?utm
_source=Storage&utm_medium=Headline&utm_campaign=GTMDaily.
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Annual reports summarize how all companies within that
sector are performing against target, with call-outs for which
metrics are not being met now and which ones may not be met
in future years.
Mid-year reviews ensure that network
companies are working efficiently and meeting targets.
Utilities are punished for lack of performance, as they can have
revenues decreased annually based on incentive penalties for
not meeting outputs. If the poor performance or inefficiency
continues, they endure more intrusive and heavy-handed
regulation along with lower returns. Importantly, in RIIO,
poorly performing or inefficient utilities “could see rates of
return below the cost of debt.”128 This potential does not exist
currently for regulated utilities in the United States. It should.
This output- and metric-driven performance-based
structure unites well with the theory of proportionate
treatment,129 where companies are scrutinized during rate
cases and other regulatory proceedings based on how well they
have met expectations, including how efficiently they have
spent ratepayer funds in the past. This does several things.
First, it incents utilities to provide good information, deliver
the outputs promised, including safety, health, and
environmental goals, and provide improved customer service.
Second, it rewards these companies by decreasing their
regulatory burden, freeing them to spend more time running
their business and continuing to improve outputs.130
Incorporating this idea of proportionate treatment into
U.S. regulatory reform for both generation and transmission
and distribution would provide the same benefits. Rather than
all utilities going through the same integrated resource plan
(IRP) process, for example, well-justified, customer- and
efficiency-centric plans which also met safety, health and
128. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 47.
129. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 61.
130. Incidentally, this is similar to a situation my father, Edwin Simon,
a former U.S. Marine, told about basic training. The unit with the best daily
performance did not have to work at kitchen duty the next day. Once his unit
achieved the best daily performance, they spent the time everyone else was
doing kitchen duty the next day doing extra drills, to ensure that they were
the best that day as well, and, therefore, did not have to do kitchen duty the
next day either. This continued daily for the rest of basic training, ensuring
the unit never had to do kitchen duty. Rather than spending their time on
administrative issues, they focused instead on increasing performance.
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environmental goals could be subject to a fast-track mechanism
with less regulatory scrutiny. For rate cases and distribution
resource plans, the same could be true. Utilities that submit
cases or plans which fall short of public expectations around
service, environmental management, and cost controls would
be subject to more scrutiny and, therefore, a higher
administrative and regulatory burden. Additionally, Ofgem
and many states have already decoupled energy sales from
utility profits directly; however, all are dealing with the similar
constraints that utilities have a profit motive to expand capital
investments, since each still includes a rate of return on assets
in transmission and distribution utility profits.131 The same is
true for generation assets in vertically integrated utilities.
Focusing on total expenditures, rather than either on
operational expenses or capital expenses, is one way for
regulators to manage these long-lasting costs to ratepayers.
Limiting—as a percentage—the amount of total expenditures
utilities can add to regulatory asset value and using a real
weighted average cost of capital could ensure utilities are not
making unnecessary capital investments, locking consumers
into paying for unnecessary equipment in rate cases for
decades to come. The potential for this long-term asset
padding is something regulators may need to be especially
mindful of as regulatory incentives and frameworks change.132

131. Bentham Paulos, Regulating the Utility of the Future: Implications
for the Grid Edge, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Jan. 2015), 1, 14
http://www.greentechmedia.com/research/report/regulating-the-utility-of-thefuture.
132. For example, ComEd is planning on spending $2.6 billion over 10
years on infrastructure, which will be added into the rate base. Jeffrey
Tomich, ComEd CEO Pramaggiore: 'Network Economies Rule', ENERGYWIRE
(July 23, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2015/07/23/stories/10600
22279. SoCal Edison is planning on spending $347-560 million between 2015
and 2017, and then an additional $1.4-2.585 billion between 2018 and 2020.
Jeff St. John, California’s Distributed Energy Grid Plans: The Next Steps,
GREENTECH MEDIA (July 7, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/californias-distributed-energy-grid-plans-the-nextsteps?utm_source=Solar&utm_medium=Picture&utm_campaign=GTMDaily.
Even Duke Energy, operating where there is no push to deregulate, is putting
more equipment into the capital base than is currently needed: “We’re going
to build headroom into our systems, today and into the future[.]” Jeff St.
John, The Big Picture from Grid Edge Live 2015, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 29,
2015),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-big-picture-fromgrid-edge-live-2015.
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Having an annual scorecard between all companies in a
sector adds to transparency, increasing customer trust. This is
clearly possible in deregulated markets, where potentially
numerous companies exist under the purview of a single
regulator. New York’s transmission and distribution utilities
are an example of this. However, in places like North Carolina
where there is essentially a single, vertically integrated utility,
a state-level scorecard comparison would be meaningless.
However, benchmarking across state lines is still possible.
While this may be more complicated due to state-level control,
it is possible for state regulators to work together to require
even vertically integrated utilities to submit figures calculated
in the same manner and including the same information. That
way, they, as regulators, could have better data with which to
assess their utilities.
V. Regulatory Reform Currently Underway in the U.S.: New
York As A Case Study
States within the U.S. are grappling with some of the same
challenges identified by Ofgem: how to adapt the regulatory
structure to incorporate low carbon generation, enabling
transmission investment, and doing both while maintaining
affordability and reliability. New York’s Reforming the Energy
Vision (“REV”) process is especially insightful as to where
RIIO’s concepts could be applied, as New York has the same
regulatory structure as the United Kingdom: competitive
wholesale generation, regulated monopoly transmission and
distribution, and competitive retail. This section will therefore
discuss REV and the extent to which it does – or does not –
learn from RIIO’s example.
New York is currently undergoing, arguably, the largest
structured rate reform process in the United States, and, like
RIIO, it’s turning out to be very complex.133 REV will look at
both incentives used in setting rates, including “input versus

133. Katherine Tweed, Wants Versus Needs: The Struggle to Realize New
York's
Energy
Vision,
GREENTECH
MEDIA
(May
27,
2015),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/wants-vs.-needs-the-struggleto-realize-new-yorks-energy-vision?utm_source=Daily&utm_medium=Head
line&utm_campaign=GTMDaily.
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outcome-based ratemaking,” and rate design.134 The goal is “to
create excellent, innovative companies.”135 Similar to RIIO,
REV has six policy goals: enhanced customer knowledge136 and
tools that will support effective management of their total
energy bill; market animation and leverage of ratepayer
contributions; system-wide efficiency; fuel and resource
diversity; system reliability and resiliency; and reduction of
carbon emissions.137
Of course, the biggest change proposed in REV is the
creation of distributed system platform providers (“DSP”) to
manage electricity flows on the grid, sitting between the
wholesale market, retailers, third-party providers and
customers. Traditional utilities—at least initially—will fulfill
the role of the DSP, but plenty of questions remain, especially
around data and customer management, rate and market
structure, incentives, and cost.
The public service staff did acknowledge RIIO in the
original REV scoping document.138 Staff favorably noted the
extended eight-year term, a focus on outcomes, and the totex
approach.139
However, they expressed doubt about
implementing much of RIIO due to potential issues with
134. REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. No.
14-M-0101, at 51-52 (2014).
135. Paulos, supra note 131, at 62.
136. In discussing REV with the public, staff starts with the mission of
providing affordable, safe, secure and reliable access across utility sectors
while protecting the environment. Focusing on the customer experience, staff
acknowledges electricity and information currently flows in one direction
only, from the utility to the consumer, with information only on a monthly
basis, and with electricity provided on aging infrastructure. With increasing
bills, customers are worried about affordability, reliability and resiliency,
while the current regulatory framework produces disincentives around
innovation and the development of new technologies. Staff stresses that new
technology will provide customer opportunities in distributed generation,
reducing the need for infrastructure investment, will improve efficiency, and
enable a new marketplace for consumer options. While referencing the
proposed market structure, the materials focus on enabling customer
participation and that customers will get paid as electricity producers.
Reforming the Energy Vision: What it Means to Energy Consumers, N.Y.
STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. (2015), http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/
96f0fec0b45a3c6485257688006a701a/26be8a93967e604785257cc40066b91a/$
FILE/88708408.pdf/NEW%20REV%20FEB%202015.pdf.
137. Paulos, supra note 131, at 62.
138. REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, supra note 134, at 54-56.
139. Id. at 55.
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benchmarking and the belief that that benchmarking would be
necessary to implement RIIO’s ratemaking structure.140
However, the difference between rural, upstate New York and
Manhattan is similar to the difference between rural Scotland
and central London.
Public staff did not comment on
proportionality.
Those responding to the public staff document, however,
were more complementary, noting that REV should “reward
results, not utility spending.”141 At least some of these
comments seem to have swayed public staff; the white paper on
ratemaking and utility business models was much more
favorable toward concepts included in RIIO than would have
been expected from previous documents.
Public staff acknowledged that “[u]tilities’ earnings are
heavily dependent on their capital expenditures,” and that
integrating increasing levels of renewables may require
increases in operating expenses and decreases in capital
expenses.142 As decreasing capital expenses will decrease the
asset rate base, leading to longer-term lower returns, there are
currently financial incentives for the utility to maintain capital
spending.143 Public staff recognized that “[t]he conventional
rate treatment of utility capital and expenses is in conflict with
a reformed energy vision” and that “any structural financial
incentive embedded in regulation for a utility to favor its own
capital spending” must be eliminated.144
While public staff recognized that the “totex” approach had
been employed by RIIO to “make the utility somewhat
indifferent to the type of expenditure,” and noting that REV
shared the same goal, public staff dismissed the totex approach
140. Id. at 55-56.
141. Email from Elizabeth B. Stein, Environmental Defense Fund, to
Honorable Kathleen H. Burgess (July 18, 2014) (http://blogs.edf.org/energy
exchange/files/2014/07/EDF-Track-2-REV-Comments.pdf) (Re: Comments on
Case 14-M-0101 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to
Reforming the Energy Vision).
142. STAFF WHITE PAPER ON RATEMAKING AND UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS,
supra note 30, at 3. “Unlike competitive companies whose long-term increase
in profitability is driven by growing revenues and controlling costs, utilities’
earnings are largely a function of increasing investment and controlling
short-term expenses.” Id. at 22.
143. Id. at 39 (“Thus, utilities have inherent interests in growing rate
base through capital expenditures.”).
144. Id. at 23.
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as too complicated for accounting reasons and requested that
stakeholders suggest other approaches that could be used.145
However, rather than invent something new, it seems that the
totex approach does meet the goal of limiting the amount of
capital added into the rate base and could still be used. Using
totex, it is possible that the amount of capital included in a rate
base would be different from the amount of capital included on
a GAAP balance sheet. However, as the amount included in
the rate base is not a public financial statement, the amount of
capital in each would not need to be reconciled. Having two
standards would result in a higher administrative burden, but
certainly seems possible to meet an objective which public staff
has not found another way to achieve.
Public staff also recommended that more performance- or
output-based metrics be included in rate cases,146 “such that
utility earnings are based on performance and achievement of
outcomes rather than almost entirely on capital spending.”147
They are seen “as an opportunity to increase earnings without
adding to base rates.”148 However, for three of the initial five
“earnings impact mechanisms” (“EIMs”), the recommendation
is to only allow for positive incentives, allowing these to be
mechanisms only to increase utility revenues.149
Like RIIO, the public staff also recommends standardized
metrics, with the “method of measuring performance . . .
uniform across utilities.”150 Much longer than the current list
that would affect earnings,151 these “should be used for
145. Id. at 43-44.
146. “New approaches that are tied to successfully driving desired
outcomes, including greater use of performance incentives, should be
initiated and applied to a range of policy objectives built around market,
customer, and environmental goals.” Id. at 9.
147. Id. at 29.
148. Id. at 31.
149. Id. at 54. The five proposed categories are peak reduction, energy
efficiency, customer engagement and information access, affordability, and
interconnection. Id. at 55-59. Public staff recommended that the EIMs for
data access and interconnection have some potential negative adjustment, as
these are mainly within the control of the utility. Id. at 61.
150. Id. at 60.
151. The list includes: system utilization and efficiency; DG, energy
efficiency, and dynamic load management (DLM) penetration; opt-in time-ofuse rate efficacy; market development; MBE use; carbon reduction; customer
satisfaction; customer enhancement; and conversion of fossil-fueled end uses.
Id. at 64-66.
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planning, transparency, and accountability,”152 but will have no
direct impact on revenues.
Thus, RIIO’s concept of
benchmarking does appear like it will be adopted, at least in
some form.
RIIO’s process—and with it, proportionate assessment and
longer rate cases—was clear in its goals of providing regulatory
certainty and the ability of network companies to focus on the
business. The public staff recommendations seem to suggest
similar goals,153 but have provided none of the regulatory
clarity or certainty necessary to achieve these objectives. For
example, the public staff has recommended that the standard
rate case be maintained at three years, but with the potential
for that to be extended for an additional two for “highAdditionally, the public staff
performing utilities.”154
recommends that “[m]any EIMs should be established on a
multi-year basis,”155 as occurs in RIIO for outputs. However,
the public staff process, as explained, provides none of the
“stability and predictability” they say they want: rate cases are
set for the same maximum duration as currently, and rate
plans are subject to being reopened.156 While reopening is
possible in RIIO, the conditions which would allow reopening
are specified during the price control review. REV does not
seem to be so prescriptive, allowing for unnecessary
uncertainty. Proportionate assessment may occur in that
“high-performing utilities” which meet outcomes will be able to
extend a rate case to five years; however, this does not impact
the original or subsequent rate cases or how EIMs are set.
REV could do more to ensure stability and regulatory certainty
than is currently proposed.
The only place where the public staff seems to contemplate
decreased revenue is in potential changes to the current
earnings sharing mechanisms (“ESM”). The ESMs allow the
utility to retain earnings above the baseline return on equity
152. Id. at 29.
153. “Utilities, customers and market participants will benefit from the
stability and predictability of a multi-year plan as REV markets are
developed. . . . Utilities will be better able to focus on developing DSP
capabilities and [sic] if they are not diverted into time-consuming and
contentious rate proceedings.” Id. at 70.
154. Id. at 70-71.
155. Id. at 60.
156. Id. at 72.
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and return part of that to its shareholders with the remainder
going to customers.
However, even with the changes
contemplated, a utility with inferior outcomes would still
receive the baseline ROE level. The shareholders sharing
additional revenues with customers would only start at that
baseline level. This is less draconian—and, therefore, less of a
disincentive for poor performance—than RIIO’s potential of
return dropping below the actual cost of debt.
VI. Conclusion
Regulatory reform is happening and will continue,
potentially more quickly, especially with new federal rules like
the Clean Power Plan. New York’s REV process seems to be
taking some direction from RIIO, but could do more to meet
enumerated goals. Rather than reinvent pieces – especially on
the process side – to meet objectives, New York and other
states have the ability to move forward more quickly with
reforms.
Analyzing regulatory frameworks from other
jurisdictions will enable them to do just that.
While each of the states continues to find its own way, one
option to instill performance-based regulation nationally is for
federal policy to make it a priority. This could also ensure that
environmental goals—being implemented with performancebased metrics in the U.K. and potentially in New York—are
addressed in energy regulation, something currently
haphazard at best.157 Requiring environmental goals to be met
as outputs, with earnings tied to them, should become part a
larger part of the regulatory landscape in the United States.
RIIO has shown a viable path forward for that to occur more
quickly than starting from scratch.

157. See Victor B. Flatt & Heather Payne, Not One Without the Other:
The Challenge of Integrating U.S. Environment, Energy, Climate and
Economic Policy, 44 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1079 (2014).
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